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INTE:I{NATIONAL LAW AND RELIGION IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE BEAGLE
CHANNEL DISPUTE
M.C. Mirow*
We have accepted your suggestion of mediation,
but for the Argentine Republic the only mediator
possible is his Holiness the Pope. 1

With these words, in 1978, an Argentine diplomat proposed
a method of defusing a territorial dispute that very nearly
sparked off a war between Argentina and Chile. It.was an offer
calculated to be rejected by Chile, and yet Chile's immediate
response was "Agreed" - a response so unthinkable to Argentina that within hours its military Junta revoked the power of the
Foreign Minister and the President fo sign the agreement it had
just proposed. In December 1978, the countries were quickly
moving towards a war that, if waged, would most likely have
engulfed much of Latin America. The Vatican, however, intervened and brought peace between the parties. 2
Today, outside the countries involved, few remember the
Beagle Channel dispute because it was successfully negotiated
to a peaceful solution. The dispute has been recounted in sev* Associate Professor of Law and founding faculty member, Florida International University College of Law, Miami; Ph.D. (law), Leiden University; Ph.D.
(law), Cambridge University; J.D., Cornell University; B.A., Boston University. He is
the author of LATIN AMERICAN LA,v: A HtsTORY OF PRIVATE LA\V AND lNsTITUTIONs IN SPANISH AMERICA (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2004). The author
thanks Prof. Dr. A. Wijffels (Leiden/Louvain-la-Neuve) who provided the concept of
this article and whose constant encouragement is greatly appreciated. Thanks are also
due to Steven Harper for his excellent research assistance.
1. Argentine Foreign Minister, Carlos Washington Pastor, to Chilean Fon~ign
Minister, Hernan Cubillos, December 12, 1978, as reported in intervie\v behveen
Cubillos and Thomas Princen, Santiago, Chile, 1986. See THoMAs PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 141 (1992) [hereinafter PRINCEN,
INTERMEDIARIES).

2. While the term "Vatican" in its strict sense refers only to the official residence
of the Pope in Rome or the Vatican City State, I use it here to refer more generally to
the papal government including the Holy See and its office responsible fbr international relations. See generally JORRI DUURSMA, FRAG?vlENTATI,ON AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MtcRo-STATES, 374-419 (1996); Robert John Araujo, The
International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 291,
291-360 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1724698
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era! historical and journalistic works in Argentina and Chile. 3 It
has been used generally as a case .study to inform discussions of
international law, diplomacy, and mediation. 4 Thomas Princen,
the leading American scholar of the conflict, has used the dispute to probe theoretical aspe.cts of the goals and effectiveness
of mediation. 5 Others too have used the case to illustrate the
diplomatic process and the value of long-lasting negotiation in
the face of apparent stalemate;6 Although all studies note the
unique nature of the Pope and Vatican as mediators in reaching
a peaceful solution, no study has attempted to analyze the role
of the Vatican through the lens of Roman Catholicism.7
This article seeks to contribute in this direction. Attempting to view the Vatican's intervention, actions, and procedures in
3. See, e.g.,

SANTIAGO BENADAVA, REcuERoos DE LA MEorAcION PoNTIFICIA

ENTRE CHILE Y ARGENTINA (1978-1985) (Santiago, 1999) (Benadava was a member

of the Chilean _negotiating- team);

ALBERTO MAR!N MADRID,

EL CAso

DEL

CANAL

BEAGLE (Santiago, 1987) (Chilean ColonelMarfn served on a commis.sion addressing
the Argentine -and Chilean border); ALVAREZ NATALE, BEAGLE: DE Bnu1os Y
FANTASMAS A LA -DECISION

FINAL (Buenos Aires, 1984) (using the dispute to critique

nationalism and to argue for La_tjn American integration);
DELIRIO ARMADO.: ARGENTINA~CHILE, LA GUERRA QUE

BRUNO PASSARELLI,

EL

EvtTd EL PAPA (Buenos
Aires, 1998) (Passarelli covered the event for the Argentine media); Luis ALFONSO
TAPIA, ESTA NocHE: LA GUERRA (Vina del Mar, 1997) (Tapia covered the event for
the Chilean media); FABIO V10 VAL01v1Eso, LA ME01Ac16N DE S.S. EL PAPA JuAN
PABLO II (Santiago, 1984). Much of the dispute must be reconstructed from individual accounts because the pertinent papers in the Vatican are sealed for seventy-five
years after the event. See BENADAVA, supra, at 10.
4. See Gilbert Apollis, La Mediation Internationale du Pape Jean-Paul ll dans
!'A/faire du. Canal de Beagle, in Jo£L-BENOtT o'ON0R10, LE SAINT-SIEGE DAN LES
RELATIONS lNTERNATIONALEs, 323-61 (Paris, 1989); HenryT. King, Jr. & Marc A. Le
Forestier, Papal Arbiiration: Hott' the Early Catholic Chui-ch Influenced Modern Dispute Resolution, 52 SMO D1sr. REsoL: J. 74, 78 (1997); Guillermo R Moncayo, La
Mediation Pontijicale dans l'Affaire du Canal Beagle, 242 RECUEIL DES CouRs DE
L'ACAD~MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 197-433 (The Hague, 1993) (Moncayo
served as chief of the Argentine negotiating team from 1979 to 1982). Moncayo's
study contains a bibliography. Id. at 428-33.
5. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1; Thomas Princen, International
Mediation-The Vie1v froni the Vatican: Lessons ft·o1n Mediatlng tile Beagle channel
Displlte, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 347-66 (1987) [hereinafter Princen, Mediation];
6, See Mark Laudy, The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis
Intervention and Forun1 Building, iii WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT, 293-320 (Melanie c. Greenberg et al. eds.,
2000); Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation Resolves a
Centwy-Old Displlle, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 435 (1987).
7. One author has chronicled the response of the Argentine episcopacy and has
abstracted over 150 public statements of the Church's hierarchy in Argentina addressing the dispute. See CLAUDIO Gomo, EL BEAGLE, LA IGLESIA v AMERICA LATINA
(Buenos Aires, 1984).
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this way provides important insights into numerous aspects of
the dispute. Not only does this approach yield a useful analytical tool for understanding the role of the Vatican in the Beagle
dispute, but also it signals some of the prospects of and limitations to similar interventions by the Vatican in the future.
Before addressing Vatican involvement, this article sets out the
nature of the dispute between Argentina and Chile as essential
background to the analysis that follows.
I. THE

A.

DISPUTE

The Importance of the Beagle Channel in the Late 1970s

The Andes Mountains have long provided a clear geographical feature for much of the border between Argentina and
Chile. The southernmost tip of South America, however, does
not have a geographical and historically recognized boundary.
Even the language of the governing document clarifying the
border between Argentina and Chile, the Boundary Treaty of
1881, was open to varying interpretations concerning the ownership of the numerous islands at the tip of the continent. This
treaty uses the Beagle Channel, a channel connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and lying to the south of the betterknown Straits of . Magellan, as an important geographical
marker.s The treaty gives Chile '.'all the islands to the south of
Beagle Channel' up to Cape Horn, and those there may be to the
west of Tierra de! Fuego." 9
For decades, Argentina and Chile expressed little interest in
making a final determination of the boundary, ownership of islands, and delimitation of navigational waters in the area. This
lack of concern over the imprecision of the arrangement was, for
Argentina, painted against a backdrop of a general political and
geographical agreement between the two countries that Argentina would have an exclusive presence in the Atlantic Ocean and

8. See

THOMAS PRINCBN, BEAGLE CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS

1 (Case 401, Insti-_

tute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., 1995) [hereinafter PmNCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL].
9. Id. at 1 (quoting translation as found in Jose Miguel Barros, CHILEAN-ARGENTINE RELATIONS: THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONTROVERSY 83-84 (1978}).
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Chile in the Pacific Ocean. This understanding on the division
of the oceans was ·termed "bioceanismo. "10
Seeing mutual benefits in closer trading agreements in the
1960s, the countries realized that such peripheral matters as the
Beagle Channel islands needed to be resolved. 11 By the late
1970s, other factors played into their desire for permanent resolution. These included the area's potential oil and mineral deposits, fishing rights, and a heightened international attention
towards the Antarctic region in general during this period. 12
The changing consequences of territorial ownership under international law had also greatly increased the value of these islands
to the countries. Since the Treaty of 1881, international law recognized increasingly larger maritime claims based on ownership
of land. In the 1880s, a three-mile maritime territorial claim was
common. Since the 1940s, several Latin American countries
claimed 200-mile zones as patrimonial seas. By the early 1980s,
through the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, a territorial limit of twelve miles and an exclusive economic zone of 200
miles were recognized as rights emanating from territorial s.overeignty to land. The navigational and maritime rights resulting
from the ownership of the islands were the central issue in the
dispute. 13 After unsuccessful attempts at direct negotiation on
the ownership of the islands and related maritime rights, the
countries agreed to submit the dispute to arbittation. 14

B.

Arbitration and its Rejection

From 1902 until the early 1970s, Argentina and Chile made
numerous attempts to settle their rights in regard to the islands
near the mouth of the Beagle Channel. Other territorial disputes between the two countries had been successfully resolved
through arbitration in the past. 15 This dispute, however, was unsuccessfully addressed through direct negotiation, diplomatic
10. See BE.NADAYA, supra note 3, at 15-16; PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 55. The
bi-oceanic: principle was restated in a Protocol from 1893 that sought to clarify the
1881 treaty. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436-37, 445:
11. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 134.
12. See David M. Hinunelreich, Note, The Beagle Channel Affair: A Failure in
Judicial Pursuasion [sic], 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971, 971 (1979); Laudy, supra
note 6, at 296, 298; Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436-37.
13. See Laudy, supra note. 6, at 296; Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436.
14. See-P_RINcEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2.
15. See Moncayo, supra note 4, at 251-54.
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protests and, in 1960, by a ruling of the International Court of
Justice, which was not accepted by the countries. 16 Under a
treaty between Argentina and Chile from 1902, arbitration of
the disputed territory and maritime rights was to be conducted
by a panel headed by the Queen of England.17 With tensions
increasing between Argentina a.nd the United Kingdom over the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Argentina requested that arbitration
be conducted by a panel composed of members of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, and.that the panel's decisions be presented to the Queen for her assent. Chile agreed,
and the matter went to arbitration in 1971. 18
The panel, composed of judges from France, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, issued it decision in 1977.19 There were no surprises. As international legal
experts had expected, "Argentina retained navigational rights to
its naval base in the channel, and Chile was awarded the three
islands" 20 of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva located in the channel.21 The parties were given a nine,month period to execute
the decision from the time of its ratification by the Queen. 22
During the five years from the submission of the dispute to
the arbitral decision, Argentine views had changed, particularly
as a result of a military coup led by General Jorge Rafael Videla
that overthr.ew President Isabel Per6n. 23 Most of Argentina's
military leaders opposed the arbitration decision, and the foreign ministry was also divided in its support. Argentina's military believed that ownership of these channel islands would
permit Chile to have a claim to maritime rights in the Atlantic. 24
Indeed, the changes in international law related to maritime
rights dramatically increased Chile's Atlantic rights since the
1881 treaty. Casting away the nineteenth-century three mile
limit, Chile now claimed a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. 25
16. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 437; Moncayo, supra note 4, at 286-98.
17. See PR,iNCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2.
18. See id.
19. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 16-18; Lindsley, supm note 6, at 438; F.V.,
The Beagle Channel Affair, 71 AM. J. lNT'L L. 733, 735 n.4 (1977).
20. PRINCEN, supra note 1, at-134.
21. See PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2; see also,_ Moncayo, supra
note 4, at 300-24; F.V., The Beagle Channel Affair, 71 AM. J. !NT'L L. 733-40 (1977).
22. See PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2.
23. See DAVID RocK, ARGENTINA 1516-1982, at 367-70 (1987).
24. See PRJNCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l, at 134.
25. See LindSley, supra note 6, at 438.
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Instead of executing the decision after its ratification by the
Queen, Chile and Argentina went into a phase of informal negotiation.26 Chile refused to reopen the arbitration's decision and
sought only to negotiate on the question of maritime delimitation. Raising issues far beyond the ownership of three small
channel islands, Argentina sought to re.negotiate all aspects of
the dispute, because, in its view, the questions were relevant to
its sovereignty. During the second half of 1977, Argentina began mobilizing troops to the south and stepped up military exercises in the region. With Argentilla's rejection of Chile's
invitation to submit the dispute to the International Court of
Justice, Presidents Pinochet and Videla attempted a settlement
in January of 1978. Their general agreement disintegrated as negotiating teams worked to express the. details of the agreement
between the presidents. 27 On January 25, 1978, Argentina officially rejected the arbitration decision and the Queen's award
based on the decision.2s
C.

The Act of Puerto Montt and its Failure

On February 20, 1978, Chile and Argentina agreed to the
Act of Puerto Montt where they pledged to continue negotiations under a three phase process. 29 The first stage was successful in agreeing upon the procedural aspects of the negotiation.
The six-month second stage tackled the substantive aspects of
the dispute. Any movement on the issue of the ownership of the
channel islands and the maritime rights of the two countries was
insignificant. By the end of the second stage in October, 1978,
various proposals had failed. Argentina remained adamant in
its desire for the channel islands, and Chile remained steadfast
in its refusal. Argentina's military rhetoric increasingly asserted
notions of sovereignty. Pinochet spoke of principle and international policy."0 The channel islands had taken on a symbolic
26. See BENADAVA, -supra note 31 at 19-20.
27. See BENADAYA,, s1jpra, note 3, at 20-21;. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES supra
note 1, at 134-35; PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, sup;_·a note 8, at 4-5.
28. See Argentina-Chile: The Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the
Beagle Arbitration, Jan. 25-26, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 738-50; Himmelreich, supra note 12, at
974-90 (discussing arbitration decision and Argentina's grounds for rejecting it); Moncayo, supra note 4, at 324-26.
29. See BENADAVA, supra note 3 1 at 23'.°25; Moncayo, supra note 4, at 334-44;
PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES supra note 1, at 136.
30. see -PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIE;!S supra note 1, at 136.
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identity much greater than their true national or strategic value.
Chile based its position on strict readings of international law
and the favorable decision of the arbitration panel. Argentina's
position considered the changes in international law since the
Treaty of 1881 and the overall political aspects of the bi-oceanic
principle.31
As hopes for resolution faded, the political and military responses escalated. Economic sanctions, trading hindrances, expulsion of immigrants, air raid drills, and stock piling and
purchases of arms were all undertaken as the countries prepared
for the date when any extant negotiation procedures expired,
November 2, 1978.32 Negotiations fell apart and "both countries
immediately began a total mobilization of armed forces. Troops
converged on the borders, and the two navies began moving
south. "3.3
Diplomatic exchanges attempted to abate the crisis. The
key activities were conducted by Chile's Foreign Minister,
Hernan Cubillos, and Argentina's Foreign Minister, Carlos
Washington Pastor. Cubillos and his staff considered appeals to
the Organization of American States, the Uniteq Nations, and
the International Court of Justice. Chilean desires to submit the
dispute to the International Court of Justice were met with Argentine informal responses that such .a request to the court
would be tantamount to a declaration of war. 34
Mediation by a neutral third party appeared to be the only
way to prevent an eventual niilitary battle. Fropi the Chilean
perspective, the third party had to have cert[lin attributes.
Later, Cubillos was to tell Thomas Princen, "[a]nd when we talk
of power, I'm talking about influence, moral power, political
power, economic power." 35 Argentina too was rnoving towards
mediation, and Argentine candidates to undertake the task included "the King of Spain, the United Nations, the Queen of
England, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Henry Kissinger, and the Pope."36
31. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 438.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
See
See
See

PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES

id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

138.
138.
139.
139.

supra note

1,

at 137.
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THE VATICAN INTERVENTION

Preliminmy Vatican Involvement

Since mid-1978, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos visited
Pope John Paul I and sought Vatican help in the crisis. The Pope
had sent a letter to local bishops in South America to urge peace
in the region. 37 Chilean Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez had also
informed John Paul I of the worsening situation in September,
1978.38 After the death of John Paul I, as the crisis heightened,
Cubillos sought an audience with Pope John Paul II. Although
he was in office only five days at the time of their meeting, John
Paul II had been briefed and studied the situation. 39 Thus, as
aggression mounted in the region, the Vatican was somewhat
aware of the seriousness of the situation.
The selection of the Pope as the mediator came about
through an unexpected sequence of events. As of December,
1978, the Vatican made it clear that the idea of papal mediation
was "premature" and that the Pope would undertake an active
role only after a request from both governments. 40 On December 11, 1978, Cubillos arrived in Buenos Aires seeking diplomatic solutions. Thomas Princen's account of the events and of
his interview with Cubillos follow:
Cubillos arrived i.n Buenos Aires the night of December 11, 1978. He
attended a dinner hosted by Videla, Pastor, and several other highlevel officials. Among the guests was Papal Nuncio Pio Laghi. Taking Cubillos aside, Pio Laghi explained that he had had long talks
with Videla. He trusted Videla and was sure an agreement could be
reached. The official meeting began the next morning. Cubillos recalled the events of that day.
December 12th is a day I will never forget. 'I11ings were really hot.
The ambiante [sic] in Buenos Aires was one of war. I \Vas received
with proper protocol that corresponds to a foreign minister. Troops
and all sorts of things, everything done very carefully ....
I started the morning by paying an official visit to President
Videla ... I was so concerned about the power structure of Argentina I did something completely on the spur of the moment which I
had not planned on doing, but remembering my conversation with
Laghi the previous 11ight [and] having seen so·many signs that
Videla didn't have any power .... I said something that really
created a shock .... I said, Mr. President ... I want to be sure that
37. See
38. See

PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES,

39. See

PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES,

BENADAVA,

40. See id. at 140.

supra note 1, at 138.

supra note 3, at 26.

supra note 1, at 138.
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your n1inister has the power to reach a decision, I want-to be sure
he has the same power I have, which I suppose comes from you
Videla said ... Mr. Minister if you were not such a nice person, and
we didn't know each other before, and I really would ask you to
leave, because that is a very unproper question. And after having
said that, he. went on for an hour explaining to me the power structure in Argentina . . . So [he said], go at ease, make the decision,
reach an agreement with my foreign mini.ster and you can sign the
accord this evening ....
So, we went to the Palacio San Martin . . . . We entered into a
meeting alone .. , with Pastor. And we sat down and he opened
tl1e conversation saying, ["]Mr. Minister ... so that we don't lose
any time, I want to make it clear to you that we have accepted your
suggestion of mediation, but for the Argentine Republic, the only
mediator possible is his Holiness the Pope.["] I looked at him
straight in the face and said, "Agreed. What else?" And· he could
not continue the conversation.

·

Now, looking back (because we have analyzed this many times),
the Argentines played that card sure that we would not accept the
Vatican as mediator. But I think that they made a great mistake
there. Why did they think that we would not accept the Vatican?
Because relations between the government in Chile and the local
church. were lousy. But what they didn't understand ..• we had.the
[local] church on this matter on our side. And obviously,we would
accept the Vatican if it is number one on niy list. But it was incredible, I will never forget that minute, he was so taken back that he
couldn't continue the conversation ... ,

·

I think he wanted to end there and say that it bad failed because
they did not accept the Vatican. In five·minutes I was o.ut of there,
and we agreed to ask our delegations to get together and write an
agreement, and we agreed to sign it at 4:00 p.m. Then he came
back and said ... I will check with Videla .. , . So T stayed there
with my delegation and about an hour later he came beaming, smiling, and said, I have full green light, again. And so, go and write [it
up], and let's meet here at four to sign the agreement ....
Five minutes before I left, around 3:30 p.m., I received a personal
call from Pastor who was practically in tears saying, I have been
desautol'izado [disauthorized]. There will be no signing of an
agreement, I am not authorized to sign anything. President Videla
has been desautorizado by the Junta and no agreement can be
made. It was like speaking to someone who had been knocked out;
he had no reasons to give, he had no excuses. TI1ey had proposed
the Pope, I had agreed. We had had no bargaining, and he couldn't
sign ....
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Well, there I called Pio Laghi, the nuncio, and told him the full
story. I think that it was the first time ... Pio Laghi had learned
that we had agreed on the Pope .... He couldn't .believe it.41

Each country called on other powers, including the Vatican,
to act to reduce the chances of the impending war. President
Carter and the United States Ambassador to Chile, George
Landau, tried to apply U.S. pressure to bring about a peaceful
resolution, but relations with neither Pinochet nor the Argentine Junta were strong enough to exert meaningful influence. 42
Chile sought the intervention of the Organization of American
States. 43 The countries moved towards war and regional alliances were being constructed so that there was a possibility hostilities would not be limited to Argentina 11nd Chile. Peru and
Bolivia had both lost territory to Chile in the late nineteenth
century, and with Argentina as an ally, they might act to regain
these areas.44
On December 14, 1978, President Videla gave the orders
for an invasion of the islands on December 21 or 22. He told
Pio Laghi that there was no choice in the matter; if he had not
given the orders, he would have been summarily removed by the
Junta and replaced by a more extreme leader. Laghi suggested
direct intervention by the Pope, and Videla said such an act
might avert the war.45
As warships steamed towards each other in the Straits of
Magellan on December 23, Pope John Paul II announced that he
was sending a personal representative. 46 With this news, military activity froze. A few Argentine troops who had secretly
slipped into Chilean territory had to be recalled from their advanced positions. 47 The.papal representative, Cardinal Antonio
Samore, caught the next flight from Rome to Buenos Aires. It
41. PR1NcEN, INTERMEDJARIEs, supra note 1, at 140-42; see TAPIA, supra 110.te 3,
at 139-47. This version of events contrasts starkly with at least one other that places
the cause of the impasse on Chilean obstinacy to limit the scope of the mediation. See
PASSARELLI, supra note. 3, at 75-80.
42. U.S. surveillance and intelligence \Vas channeled to the Vatican throughout
the crisis and was a key source of information for the Pope. Id. See PruNcEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 143.
43. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 41.

44.
45.
46.
47.

See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 142-43.
See id; at 143.
See id. at 145.
See.PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 131.

2004]

THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

11

was Christmas Day. On arrival the following day, he was welcomed by thousands demonstrating their support for peace. 48
Despite being already in his early seventies, Samore was
the ideal person to represent the Pope's intervention. He had a
long-standing interest in Latin America and spoke Spanish fluently. He had accompanied Paul VI on his trip to Medellin, Colombia, and had been a papal nuncio in Bogota. He had been
involved with regional conferences of the Latin American episcopate, and even his religious devotion was closely tied to Latin
America. Much of his devotional worship was directed towards
the Virgin of Guadalupe. 49 Dating from early Spanish colonial
times, the tradition and image of this Virgin are perhaps the
most famous in Mexico and Latin America. She wa~ chosen patroness of many countries of Latin America, and in 1910, Pius X
declared her the Pattoness of Latin America. In 1945, Pius XII
stated that she was "Queen of Mexico and Empress of
America.''>O It is not surprising that Samore would turn to this
image of the Virgin considering its close association with Latin
America.
B.

The Mechanics: Cardinal Sainore's Offer of Bans Offices
The parties were far from mediation of the dispute by
Samore. Instead, Samore sought to offer the Church's hons offices or "good offices" to serve as a means of communication
and information for the parties. 51 Samore single-mindedly and
forcefully pressured each side to express and to concretize their
positions in a series of testing sessions of shuttle diplomacy between Buenos Aires and Santiago. Chile was steadfast in its desire to uphold the arbitral decision, and Argentina's position
was refined to include four main elements. Argentina required
that continuation of negotiations Would have to take place
under the third phase of the Act of Puerto Montt. Second, the
arbitral decision would have to be declared null. Third, the balance of Argentina's control of the Atlantic and Chile's control
48. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 144.
49. See -PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 136-37. For additional biographical information of Sa.more, see TAPIA, supra note 3, at 171:.74.
50. A.M. Garibay! K., si.1b 110111. Guadalupe, Our Lady of, in 6 NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 821-22 (1967).
51. See, e.g., Ruldolf L. Bindschedler, Good Offices, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pua.
uc INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-69 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Amsterdam, 1981); Moncayo,
supra note 4, at 214-18.
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of the Pacific would have to be maintained. Fourth, limitations
on the nature of the mediation would have to be determined
beforehand.52
After several trips back and forth between Santiago and
Buenos Aires, Samore was making progress. The prospects of
mediation by the Vatican and an agreement among the three
parties were being floated by Samore. Many drafts later, Pinochet and the Argentine Junta agreed to sign an agreement for
mediation in Montevideo. The deal had been settle.cl and was
set for signing. Despite the efforts of an Argentine army commander to stop Pastor from going to the meeting scheduled for
January 8, Pastor arrived safely in Montevideo with authority to
enter into the agreement. 53

III. THE Acr OF MONTEVIDEO
Samore knew that a further step needed to be taken, but if
he had mentioned it before the parties were committed to signing the agreement, the process would have crumbled. Samore
correctly realized that the usefulness of mediation could be immediately destroyed by one small mistake by either of the ·parties who were nervously poised towards military action.
Although the meeting at Montevideo was officially only for
signing the mediation agreement, Samore demanded that the
parties agree to withdraw forces to a status quo ante level. This
was a second, non-negotiated, part of the Act of Montevideo.
Chile accepted, but Pastor had to consult Videla who, apparently without consulting the Junta, told Pastor to agree. When
Pastor returned before the Junta, he put his position on the line
to uphold the agreement. The Junta agreed. In early January,
1979, Samore returned to the Vatican with an outline for continuing negotiations that narrowly sidestepped imminent war. 54
The Pope accepted the countries' request for mediation and
again appointed Samore as his personal representative, this time
for mediation at the. Vatican. The talented Vatican personnel
were at Samore's disposal. Samore was assisted by two priests
at the Vatican, Monsignor Faustino Sainz Munoz and the Jesuit
Fiarello Cavalli. 55 Sainz Munoz was the son of a Spanish Su52.
53.
54.
55.

See PRI_NCEN, INTERMEDIARIEs,_supra note-1,:at_ 144_-45.
See id. at 147-48.
See id. at 148-50.
See Laudy, supra note 6, at 310; Tapia, supra note 3, at 175.
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preme Court judge and had studied law in Madrid.56 From 1981,
Samore was also assisted in the mediation by the Colombian
Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo. 57 Montalvo was the son of a Colombian ambassador to the Vatican and had served as Pronuncio
in Tunis, Algeria, and Libya. He was educated in Rome and had
served as a Vatican diplomat throughout Latin America. 58
The Pope himself officially opened the mediation and met
with the delegations from Argentina and Chile. The delegation
from Argentina was headed by Guillermo R. Moncayo. Enrique Bernstein led the Chilean team. 59 The Pope wanted the
mediator to seek direction from God and offer advice to the
parties. 60 At key points in the mediation, the Pope would personally request that the parties remember the importance of
their work and the need for progress. 61
Despite such encouragement, progress was slow, and by
May, 1980, the parties had only just begun to touch on the most
sensitive aspects of the dispute: territory and maritime demarcation. Literally hundreds of meetings were conducted by Samore
both individually and jointly with the delegations. The positions
of the two countries were exactingly set out in writing. With a
stalemate languishing over the mediation, Samore sought personal papal involvement. John Paul II met with the delegations
and informed them that they were far from an agreement. He
would offer his own proposed solution.62 By mid-December,
1980, both delegations were presented not only with the papal
proposal, but also with a reminder that the Pope's actions were
necessitated because "God, the Father of all, drove [him] to
make a gesture of peace .... " 63 Part of the Pope's proposed
56. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 108.
57. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 231.
58. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 104.
59. Ian Bro,vriJie and Prosper We:il served as advisors to Chile. See BENADAVA,
supra note 3, at 63.
60. See, PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 150M51.
61. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 170.
62. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 152-'54. Benadava speculates
that the proposal was authored by San1ore- and Sainz Muftoz. See BENADAVA, supra
note 3, at 82. The Pope's message on delivering the proposal noted that it did not
seek a purely legal solution, but one "ex bono et aequo" ste1nming from the theory of
the "ancient"Roman jurists and canonists 11 \Vithout setting aside the "support and light
Of divine wisdom." BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 86.
63. PruNcEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l; at 154.
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solution was a jointly governed region covering the contested
area where both countries would have certain rights. 64
Chile accepted the proposal early in 1981, but Argentina
waited and then unofficially objected to it in March, 1981. Tensions mounted along the border between the two countries.
Again, a direct appeal from the Pope led to both governments
decreasing the possibility of violence in the region. Over the
next few months the situation in and between both countries
deteriorated. 65 Argentina stated that it would not renew a
treaty from 1972 that provided disputes between Argentina and
Chile be submitted to the International Coutt of Justice at The
Hague. Again, only through a direct formal proposal of the
Pope did both sides agree to extend this treaty which provided
for an important, non-military default procedure in the event of
unsuccessful mediation. 66 In April, 1982, Argentina entered into
war with the United Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, which some saw as a prelude to a Beagle Channel invasion. 67 Things in Chile were equally difficult as Pinochet
substituted his civilian ministers with military men. 68 Chile was
also entering a period of national economic crisis. 69 After losing
the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Argentine military government
had little power to negotiate, and it was not until new Argentine
representatives, this time "professional diplomats," appointed
by President Alfonsin, arrived that negotiations could be
renewed.10
Having spent nearly six years of his life deftly delaying war
between Argentina and Chile, Samore died on February 3, 1983.
His last words were addressed to Montalvo and Sainz Mufioz
and concerned reaching a peaceful resolution between Argentina and Chile. n
To replace Samore, the Pope requested Vatican Secretary of
State Cardinal Agustino Casaroli to step in as the new head of
the mediation team. With a change in the Argentine government, and with informal negotiations between Argentine and
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.

See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 446.
See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 154-57.
See BENADAVA, supra note ~. at 117-18.
See TAPIA, supra _nOte -3, at' 218.
See PRINCEN; INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 154~57.
See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 447.
See id. at 447.
See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 238.
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Chilean representatives stationed in Europe, slow progress towards peace could once again be seen. On January 23, 1984, the
foreign ministers of Argentina and Chile signed a Declaration of
Peace and Friendship. Within six months, Casaroli had
brokered an accord. By meeting with and pressing each party to
abandon its bargaining strategy and to make honest "confessions" for the benefit of the mediation team, Casaroli was in a
position to request proposals for a solution from both sides.
From these proposals, Casaroli prepared his own suggestions for the divisions of territory and the settlement of economic compensation, the latter to be addressed through a
bilateral commission. Casaroli's suggestions were put in front of
the Argentine and Chilean delegations on an accept-or-reject
basis, and he made it clear that a rejection by either party would
terminate papal mediation. Both accepted Casaroli's suggestions and a drafting team was brought in to prepare a treaty text.
After Argentina obtained permission to sigp. through a national
referendum on the issue, the foreign ministers of Argentina and
Chile and Casaroli signed the treaty on November 29, 1984.
Chile obtained the three disputed islands, but limited its maritime claims to a line about thirty miles to the southeast of the
islands, rather than the accepted 200 mile economic zone often
asserted. Argentina maintained the split between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans for which it was willing to wage war. 72 Peace
between the countries over this issue had been obtained. The
treaty also provided for commissions to settle disputes between
the countries and to improve economic relations. 73
IV.

FAITH-BASED INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF VATICAN INTERVENTION IN
THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

A.

The Religious Authority of the Church

Prior commentators on the Beagle Channel dispute have
readily noted the "moral" force of the Roman Catholic Church
in Latin American relations. Perhaps believing that "moral" is
an acceptable and neutral code-word for "religious," few studies
have distinctly discussed the Church as a "religious" force in set72. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 131-57;
note 1, at 158-61.
73. See Lindsley, rnpra note 6, at 449.
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tling this international dispute. Indeed, modern scholars and
practitioners of international law become uncomfortable when
the terms "religion" and "international law" are mentioned in
proximity outside of some limited contexts, such as human
rights or the history of international law. 74 As a present religious force, though, the Church is not limited to assessments of
what is right or wrong under the circumstances. For Roman
Catholics, the Church can authoritatively judge what is Good or
Evil, and what actions or omissions may lead to eternal damnation. This is something different from and additional to moral
authority; it is religious authority. As Yvonne Thayer, a former
official at the U.S. Embassy in Argentina from 1976 to 1979,
notes, "In the Latin world, the Church has a stature. that other
[mortals] don't have."15 The Church's·unique authority, its religious authority, helps explain why on De.cember 23, 1978,
Chile and Argentina chose to listen to John Paul II's appeal for
peace. 76 It appears that only the Pope could command their actions without a loss of military honor owtheir parts. 77 This was
true despite the individually strained relations between the dictatorships and the Church both at home and in Rome. 78
Peacemaking is a religious vocation. As earthly representatives of Jesus Christ, members of the Church are called to work
for peace. 79 Samore himself saw his presence in the region as
74. See HAROLD J. BER~IAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LA\V
AND RELlOION 277-87 (1993); William P. George, Grotiu~• .Theology, and Intemational Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 605, 606 (1999-2000); Mark W. Janis, Religion and
The Literature of International La1v: SOnre Standard Texts, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 121-43 (Mark W. Janis.& Carolyn Evans eds., TI1e Hague, 1999); David
Kennedy, /n1ages of Religion in International Legal-Theory, in RELIGlON AND INTER·
NATIONAL LA,V, supral' at 145-53. Cf. FAITH~BASED DIPLOMACY: TRUMPING REALPOLITIK

(Douglas Johnston ed., 2003); RELIGION, THE

MISSING DIMENSION OF

STATECRAIT (Douglas Jolmston & Cynthia Sampson eds., 1994) (essays illustrating

the importance of religion in international peacemaking).
75. See Lindsley,.supra note 6, at 443 (citing Yvonne Thayer, Director of Face-toFace, Carnegie Endowment, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Argentina, 1976-1979
(Nov. 26 1985)).
76. See id. at 444.
77. See id. at 453.
78. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 317.
79. "All citizens and all govetnrrients are obliged ·to \York for the avoidance of
war ... CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CI<U!'CH § 2308 (1994). See generally id. at §§
2302-17. For the historical background of the Church's activities in \Vorking to,vards
peace between belligerent Countries and its involvement in peace treaties, see W1LHELM G. GRE\VE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-59, 106-13, 141-62
(Michael Byers trans., Berlin, 2000); Apollis, supra note 4, at 326-35; King & Le
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something beyond a typical offer of assistance by a neutral third
party. He spoke of "mission and not of mediation," of the newness of such intervention, and .of God as the prince of peace and
the Holy Virgin as the queen of peace.Bo Indeed, his aim was
"not to continue the negotiation in a strict juridical plan [sic] nor
in a political plan in the sense that it means to dispense with the
law, but rather in a new plan, in a higher plan-if you permit a
priest to express it like this-spiritual. "B1 Likewise, John Paul II
described his involvement in the dispute in 1979 as stemming
from his identity as "one who considers that peace is one of the
greatest human values and its pursuit and realization a desire,
nay more, a mandate of the Son of God made Man, the Prince
of Peace, whose vicar Providence has made me among men." 82
The Pope, as a religious authority; was called upon to bring
peace between Argentina and Chile as the dispute grew out of
control. As early as September, 1978, Cubillos met with Pope
John Paul I in whose short time as Pope sent a letter imploring
the Episcopal conferences of Argentina and Chile to work for
peace.B3 The letter noted the many common attributes of the
countries, including their identical religious ties. B4 Certainly, a
direct personal request from the Pope to a faithful Catholic
would be a very difficult request to refuse.B5 As the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Air Force said at the time,
Forestier, supra note 4, at 75-77; Moncayo, s1q1ra note 4, at 256-71; Alain Wijffels,
Martinus Garatus Laudensis on Treaties, in PEACE TREA'l'IEs AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AoEs TO WORLD WAR ONE

192-193 (Randall Lesaffer ed., Cambridge, 2004). It appears the invocation at the
beginning of the 1984 treaty-"In the name of Almighty God"-the same invocation
of the Treaty of 1881, had more rhetorical value than religious significance. See
SERGIO GUTIERREZ 0LIVQS 1 COMENTARIO SOBRE· EL TRATAD-0 DE PAZ Y AMISTAD

coN ARGENTINA 20 (Santiago, 1986).
80. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 147 (citing and translating from
ARMANDO AMUNCHASTEQUI ASTRADA, ARGENTINA-CJiJLE 184 (1980)).
81. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l, at 147 (citing and translating from
ARMANDO AMuNcttASTEQUI AsTRADA, ARGENTINA-CHILE 184 (1980)).
82. Princen, Mediqtioi'l; -Supra note 5, at 349. For a discus_sion of the "mediative
filnctions'' of-religion fujnternational law, see James A.R. Nafziger, The Functions of
Religion in the In_ternatiqnal Legal Systen1, in RELcG10N AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V,
supra note 74, at 170-71.
83. See TAPIA, supra note 3, at 110-12.
84. See BENADA.VA, supra note 3, at 27.
85. "For the Ronian Pontiff, by reason of his office as Vicar of Christ, and as
pastor of the entire Church has full, supreme, and universal power over the \Vhole
Church, a power \Vhich he can ahvays exercise unhindered." CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at § 882 (quoting Llanen gentiurn 22).
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"Como es posible decide que no al Papa?" (How is it possible
to say no to the Pope?). 86 So important was the Pope as head of
the mediation that his scheduled visit to England during the Falklands/Malvinas War to improve Roman Catholic relations with
the Church of England had to be balanced with a quickly
planned visit to Argentina immediately afterwards. Nonetheless, in the thirty-six hours he spent in ·Argentina, he publicly
implored his audience for peace no'less than twenty-five times. 87
The Church's religious authority might undermine its claims
of neutrality, an attribute essential for effective and valid mediation. Nonetheless, on the political level, the Church offered
neutrality. Because it lacks traditional military or political ambitions, it maintains a. high level of "disinterestedness and objectivity" in disputes between other cow1tries. 88 Since 1929, the
Vatican has agreed to refrain from taking sides in international
disputes and to interpose itself only when requested by states. 89
In this sense, the Church was about as politically neutral a mediator one could find. On the religious level, the Church was far
from neutral. Because the Church asserts. a spiritual jurisdiction
over Roman Catholics throughout the world, it and its members
had a spiritual jurisdiction over the actors in this dispute. 90 Part
of the Church's mission is to maintain and promote peace. 91
Any hindrance of this mission, might cast those responsible into
spiritual danger. It is unlikely that such spiritual sanctions had
to be expressed specifically or individually to be felt by the negotiating teams and their governments. To faithful Catholics
dealing one-on-one with the highest levels of the Church, the
86. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 174. Analyzing the role of the Pope in the
\Vork of Martinus Garatus, Wijffels provides and ex<.imple of this tradition: "Whereas
the emperor's role in De confoederatione is almost reduced to its vanishing point, the
pope as the supreme authority of the community of actors is strongly asserted. His

superiority in Jure over the princes is unequivocally established, though the role
ascribed to him often seems to take into account that his superiority is rather a matter

of law, moral authority and religious duty than political (or military) clout." Wijffels,

supra note 79, at 191.
87. See PAsSARELLl, supra· note 3, at 227-28.
88. See {"rincen, Mediation, _sJlpl'a note 5,. at 349.
89, See N1cHO~AS J. HERCULES, HoLv SEE_ DIPLOMACY: A STUDY OF NONALIGNMENT IN THE PosT WORLD WAR T\VO ERA 5 (M.Sc. dissertation, University of
Bristol, 1998), available at http://w\V\V.petersnet.net/i:e_search.retrieve.cfrn?RecNun1=
798 (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
90. See Princen, Mediiltion, supl'a note 5, at 348-49.
uc CHURCH, supra note 79, at §§ 836-38.
91. See supra no_te 79 and accompanying text.
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implicit spiritual pressures must have been: sufficient to provide
a uniquely coercive effect on those negotiating the dispute.
Thus, in this dispute, the Vatican had dual jurisdictions. The
first, a consensual jurisdiction, gave it authority under international law to mediate the dispute. The second, an assumed silent
jurisdiction, gave it the ability to exert itself directly on the actions of any Catholic involved in the dispute,92
The religious authority of the Vatican in the dispute was not
expressed .exclusively on the level of the Pope and bishops. The
Vatican provided a mediation team composed entirely of clergy,
"individuals who were trained to listen, to be understanding, to
be patient, to try to reconcile differences. "93 They could be
trusted with confidences, but could also use their position to coerce information. For example, at a later stage of the negotiations, the Vatican requested that each team state its position "as
if in confession."9• Taken seriously, this would require the
team's "diligent self-examination" and the revelation of its
"most secret" information.95 Only with priests could such a request be imagined in the course of negotiating an international
dispute.
Priests are also trained to pray, and the priests involved in
resolving this dispute sought God's help in securing peace. 96 Various accounts of the dispute record the papal nuncio, Laghi,
turning to prayer in the last days of December, 1978, waiting for
Vatican intervention. 97 The very evening John Paul II sent word
to the presidents of Argentina and Chile that he was willing to
intervene based upon their request, he directed his prayer towards the Holy Spirit.9s Even as Cubillos and Pastor signed the
agreement, Samore was said to have prayed under his breath
92. Although this second jurisdiction forcefully guided Catholics involved in the
dispute, there were·, of course, non-Catholics who made importaht contributions to
the mediation. See BeNADAVA, supra note 31 at 67-68.
93. Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 349.
94. PruNcEN, INTERfy!EriIARIES, supra n_ote 1, at 180.
95. See CATEci11sM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at § 1456.
96. The author here-follo\vs William W. Park's suggestion that part of writing on
la\v and religion is _to "sho\v ·an appre·ciation of \Vhat religion means in the life of
individual believers" arrd 'to "tak[e] seriously the religious experience itself," William
W. Park, Spiritual Energy and Secular Po~ver, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V,
supra note 74, at 270.
97. See PASSARELLI, sup1;a note 3, at 106.
98. See id. at 127.
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giving thanks for the. intervention of the Holy Spirit.99 Samore
and Latin America's affinity for the. Virgin of Gaudalupe made
her a frequent intercessor during the peace process. The mediation at the Vatican opened with mass and the veneration of the
Virgin of Guadalupe.100 Numerous times during the dispute,
Samore sought .the .guidance of the Virgin of Guadalupe. 101
Through its bishops in the two countries, the Church continually
called on the faithful to pray for a peaceful outcome to the
mediation.102
Movement towards peace was also found in religious festivals, arranged pilgrimages, and in the liturgy .103 Masses were
celebrated at various points during the mediation. 104 Samore
celebrated mass in Lujan, near Buenos Aires, shortly after arriving in Argentina and offered prayers of thanks before the Virgin
on obtaining the agreement for the Pope to mediate the dispute.105 Providing geographical balance, Samore likewise celebrated mass in Maipu, Chile, during his shuttle diplomacy
between the countries. 106 An important breakthrough in the
mediation camethe day after Samor6's death, when John Paul II
said mass for his soul. In addition to the numerous cardinals
and Church officials present, the delegations from Argentina
and Chile also attended.
And when the moment for the embrace of peace came, Colonel
Videla and Ambassador Llupis (of Chile] shook hands. Behind them,
the other diplomats of Chile and Argentina extended their right
hands. At that moment, this gesture acquired an immense testimo- ·
nial value. It was as if these old and stubborn .archenemies were tacitly laying down their arms to the fallen cardinaJ.107

It was this type of conversion that the Church sought to
obtain between the countries. It seems implausible that a discussion of Argentina and Chile in the late 1970s has not yet
touched on their internal conditions or their horrid record for
99. See id. at 157.
100. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 61.
lOl. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 208, 233.
102. See Gomo, supra note 7, at 58-64; Mqncayo, supra note 4, at 381.
103. See Garno, supra note. 7, at 72-74.
104. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 73". The Pope also presided over private
masses for the delegations at various points of the mediation. See Apollis, supra note
4, at 355 n.67.
105. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 153-54.
106. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 54.
107. PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 240 (author's translation).
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human rights in the international community. At the time, President Carter had suspended arms sales to both countries because
of their poor human rights records. 108 Argentina was under the
control of a repressive and violent military junta. Since the mid1970s and after the death of Peron in 1974, the military wiped
out guerilla troops, sympathizers, .suspects, and innocents
through random "disappearances," murdering over 10,000 individuals. "The last phase of the guerilla war was its bloodiest and
most terrifying: all due process of law was overturned; military
patrols infested the country; thousands vanished into the prisons
and police torture chambers. " 109 Various factions of the military
vied for power, and by the early 1980s, they had steered Argentina into the calamitous Falklands/Malvinas War, which produced almost two thousand casualties. 110 The war led to the
Junta's fall from power. Videla and the military leaders of his
era were sentenced to prison in 1985.111
Pinochet's Chile was not any better. In 1973, his coup had
similarly targeted the democratically elected government of Allende, and set out relentlessly to imprison, to torture, and to
banish any opposition. Although most of the blood had been let
by 1977, "disappearances, torture, and murder were, however,
to recur at regular intervals until almost the end of the military
regime. " 112 Pinochet has faced prosecution for the crimes of
murder and torture.113
In sum, Argentina and Chile could be characterized as nationalistic military dictatorships, with miserable human rights
records, swiftly positioning themselves for war against each
other. If war broke out, Argentine aspirations included not only
the taking of the islands in question, but also an all-out occupation of Chile. The Junta had plans in hand for assaults on Santi108. See Laudy, supm note 6, at 307.
109. See Roe!(, supra note 23, at 367-68; see also MARGUERITE FE!TLOWITZ, A
LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES OF TORTURE

(1998); _NUN_CA
(1986).

MA.s: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE CoMM1ss10N ON-THE DISAPPEARED

110. See RocK, sl1pra note 23, at 374-83.
111. Marla Ines Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of De111ocratic Institutibnalization, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND
LATIN EuRoPE 21 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo eds., 2003).
112. SIMON COLLIER & WJLLIAfvt F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE, 1808-1994,

361 (Cambridge, 1996); see

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL Cor-,..tMISSION ON TRUTH AND

REcoNCILlATION (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993).
113. See lluth Wedge,vood 1 Internat_ional Crli-ninal Law and Augusto Pinochet,
40 VA. J. lNT'L L. 829-47 (2000).

22

SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1

ago and Valparafso.11• The Church, however, is accustomed to
dealing with the sinful and violent. Historically, theologically,
and institutionally, it is an expert in the area. · The Church seeks
to reconcile sinners, to turn them from evil to good, from war to
peace. In this dispute, the Church was able to apply its centuries
of experience in religious conversion to the similar problem of
political conversion. It invoked the power of God, prayer, and
liturgy. From this. central hub of faith, the Church also employed more traditional tools of international law and diplomacy
to resolve the dispute, but always with its own interpretation of
these methods.

B.

Information Control and Secrecy

The Vatican is an institution used to maintaining secrecy
and has a "low need for public disclosure and public accountability."115 As part of its function .as mediator in the Beagle
Channel dispute, the Vatican kept tight control over information
released to the public. All public statements regarding the mediation were issued jointly by the parties and the Vatican mediation team. Thus, the parties were, for the most part, unable to
try their case in the media or influence popular beliefs at
home. 116 The Vatican was the main and only official source concerning the progress of the mediation. Leaks from within the
Vatican were highly unlikely. As Princen stated, "[a]s a small,
tradition-bound institution, the Holy See is, therefore, accustomed to keephig things under wraps." 117 This control aided
greatly in resolving the dispute by removing all of the positioning and feigning the parties might otherwise have been compelled to undertake in presenting their views to the public. It
also reduced the number of relevant statements and positions of
the parties to those presented in the official course of the
mediation.
The Vatican's control of information did not end with limiting what would be presented to the public and the press; it also
114. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 17-42.
115. Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 352.
116. See id. at 348. "For the most part, the two countries followed this guide)ine
throughout this dispute. The most notable exception was the Pope's highly confidential 1980 proposal, parts of which were leaked to the Argentine press within one
-month." Laudy, supra note 6, ai-310-11; see also PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 185.
117. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 174.
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had its own means of informing the people and governments of
Argentina and Chile. With the presence of approximately 115
bishops throughout Argentina and Chile, the Vatican had a responsive and loyal system of disseminating informaticin.11s Its
influence, however, was not only limited to the Church hierarchy within each country, but also. could operate on a number of
levels simultaneously. Every Catholic Church in Argentina and
Chile was a potential outlet for information the Vatican wanted
to telegraph directly to the people of each country. The Church,
thus, had a strong popular constituency within the disputing
countries and was able to demand popular support for peace on
a grass-roots level.119 While ruling individuals in Latin American countries found it easy to disregard popular demonstrations
and unrest, such activities bolstered and instigated by the
Church were more difficult to ignore. For example, late in 1978
as the countries headed for war, "[tJhe Roman Catholic Church
in Chile and Argentina orchestrated a campaign for peace which
included marches to the Andes; youth movements, and petitions. " 120 The Vatican's means of disseminating information
proved to be especially useful when it substantially limited media access to the mediation. In this way, the long-arm aspect of
the Vatican made it effective in influencing the positions of each
party. The Vatican's reach also made it Urtusually able to exert
influence across the leadership and decision-making structure
within each country. As a result, the Vatican could put pressure
on foreign ministers, presidents, and military leaders who might
dissent to the decisions made by their respective representatives
at the negotiations.121
This proved to be particularly important in Argentina,
which, in the course of the negotiations, "had five presidents
and five delegation chiefs."122 For example, in the final days of
December, 1978, Laghi, the nuncio in Argentina, was able to
speak directly to President Videla .. Seekirtg Videla's Consent to
papal intervention, Laghi remirtded the President that the
Church opposed war and that the President, whose piety was
118. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 452. In October, 1978, Bishop Valdes Subercaseaux sent a letter to the presidents of Argentina and Chile imploriilg peace· and
love between. the countrie_s. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 28-29.
119. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 317.
120. Lindsley, supra note 6, at 441.
121. See Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 354-55.
122. Id. at 363; see also Laudy, supra note 6, at 312.
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publicly known, should seek peace through papal intervention.123 Similarly, the local episcopate in Argentina served to
communicate the gravity of the situation to Rome at the close of
1978.124 In Chile, such direct influence by the localchurch hierarchy was more limited due to the cool relationship between the
Chilean President of the Episcopal Conference and Pinochet. 125
Nonetheless, late in 1983, after the terms of the treaty had been
worked out, cardinals from Argentina and Chile sent word of
their support for the treaty to the episcopacies of their home
countries.1 26 In this and other ways, the Argentine and Chilean
cardinals also served the goal of reaching a peace.121
C.

Institutional and Structural Advantages of the Church

Roman Catholics are superb at waiting. TI1e Church has
waited almost two thousand years for the second coming of
Jesus Christ. The Church has waited centuries for the reunification of the splintered factions of sects. It sometimes waits more
than a hundred years for a final determination on a cause for
canonization. It waits for sinners to reject falsehood and embrace truth. These are big things, and they take time. Because
the stakes are so high, procedures that many believe to be painstakingly slow and detailed have become inextricably woven into
the mindset of the Church. As Sir D' Arey Osborne noted:
Not only is the atmosphere of the Vatican supernatural and universal ... but it is also fourth,dimensional, and so to speak, outside of
time ... for example, they can regard the Savoy dynasty as an interlude, and the Fascist era as an incident, in the history of Rome and
Italy. They reckon in centuries and plan for eternity and this inevitably renders their policy inscrutable, confusing, and, on occasion,
repre-hensible to practical and time'conditioned minds,128

The Church, then, possesses a different sense of time and
history than most other mediating bodies.
123. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 100-01.
124. See id. at 118-19.
125. See id. at 150; Patrick J. 11mrston, The Developme11t of Religious Liberty in
Chile, 1973-2000, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1185, 1201-29; TAPIA, supra note 3, at 216
(describing activity of Chilean nuncio \Vith Pinochet.to advance peaceful settlement).
126. See PAssARELLT, supra note 3-, at 258.
127. See TAPlA, supra.note-'3, at _133.
128. SIR D'Aacv OsBoRNE, British Ambassador to the Holy See, March 1947,
as quoted in HERCULES, supra note 89, at 2.
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The Vatican's approach to the Beagle Channel mediation
reflected this worldview. Samore's procedures included many
separate meetings with each side, with face-to-face meetings reserved only for issues that were not contentious. The stances of
each side were written in detailed position statements. 1w This
not only served the Vatican mediation team in gathering information and assessing positions, but also offered the parties the
opportunity to commit to and to solidify their views. The use of
position statements has been criticized for their tendency to lock
parties inflexibly into a particular stance, and. thus make negotiation towards common ground more difficult.13° Thomas
Princen correctly observes that such written position statements
are "standard operating procedure for the Holy See," but upon
closer examination there is something institutionally deeper
here.131 The reliance on written position statements stems from
both historical and present-day methods of truth seeking in canon law and theology in the Roman. Catholic Church. First,
from the perspective of canon law, written statements are consistent with the standard method of canonical procedure. In canon law, disputes are initiated and responded to by writings.
Evidence is collected i:n written statements often based on written questions. Judges usually rely exclusively on the written record to produce written decisions. 132 For priests familiar with
canon law and called to produce a written treaty (similar to a
canonical sentence), the written position statement is the most
obvious starting point. Second, from the perspective of theological debate, the error reflected in a written work becomes the
raw material upon which the process of correction can be imposed. The Scholastic method, second nature to theologians and
canon lawyers, requires a proposition to be disputed. As Harold
Berman writes, "[t]he method is called 'dialectical' in the
twelfth-century sense of that word, meaning that it seeks the
reconciliation of opposites. "133 The task before .these priests
trained in the Scholastic method was reconciling the opposite
positions of Argentina and Chile. Position statements were the
129. See Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 351-52.
130. See PRINCEN,, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 177; Princen, Mediation,
supra note 5, at 360-61.
131. PRINCEN, lNTERMEOIARIES, supra note 1, at-178.
132. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LA\V AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION 9F THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 250-52 (1983).
133. Id. at 131.
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raw material upon which the Scholastic method could be
worked to reach a peaceful solution. Princen has observed that,
consistent with the needs of the two parties, the method provided a highly formal and organized structure to the negotiation.'34 It is not surprising that Samore, with doctorates in both
theology and canon law, applied his trainingin these fields to
structure the resolution of an international dispute. 135
While this method was time-consuming, it appears that the
Church saw little problem in delay. Each day of negotiation,
each day of preparing position statements, was a day of peace.
Princen states one positive aspect ·Of this method was "to keep
the parties busy." 136 Delay provided an opportunity for
favorable internal changes in the disputing countries. 1.3 7 Thus, a
long period of negotiation, during which no decision was
reached, was acceptable. Patience turned out to be an essential
attribute for the Vatican team. 138 Indeed, the willingness to continue mediation over six years, even when no movement in positions was expected, led to a six-year period of peace,139
The institutional aloofness of the Vatican was a valuable attribute in its role as a mediator. While this quality supported its
neutrality towards the parties, it also meant that the Vatican
would not easily be swayed by outside interests. Its religious
interest in a peaceful and lasting reconciliation between the parties was its primary goal. As an institution, the Vatican has long
withstood public pressure against and disenchantment with its
actions and positions. IIl the face of broad and forceful criticism
by much of the modern world, Vatican priests must individually
stand up for their faith and defend the Church's position.
Samore and other members of the negotiating team were appropriately detached from outside criticism concerning their selected procedures and methods of handling the mediation.
Fmally, the Vatican offered a well-oiled bureaucratic machine. Indeed, it is staffed with professionals of the highest caliber accustomed to dealing with matters of the utmost
134. See Princen, Media_tion, supra note 5, at 361.
TAPIA, supra note 3, at 171.
136. -PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra not~_ 1, at 182.
137. See Princen, Mediation, si,pra note 5,: at 364.
138. Patience is one of the fruits of the Holy Spirit. See
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at §§ 736, 1832.
139. See Princen, Medi'ation, supra note 5, at 364.
135. See
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seriousness. For example, the Vatican could control and shape
the negotiation process with adept skill. It was used to dealing
with secular power, to afford it appropriate diplomatic respect,
and to criticize it from the superior position of religious truth. It
also provides its own counterweight of history, power, and majesty. For example, in 1980, whenJohn Paul II made his proposal
for a resolution of the conflict, the delivery of his solution was
made in person, in a solemn ceremony in the Consistorial Hall
of the Apostolic Palace - an impressive location by anyone's
standards. 140
V.

THE CHURCH'S AGENDA IN MEDIATION

The Church's main goal in intervention and mediation was
the preservation of peace between countries claiming a common
faith. Making peace is central to the religious mission of the
Church. 141 Beyond reaching a peaceful solution, the Church
may have had other things to gain by successful mediation. A
successful resolution would have greatly increased the international stature of both the Vatican and the new Pope, John Paul
II. During the time of the dispute in the region, the Church's
social conscience had been brought under close scrutiny by the
rise of liberation theology. By maintaining peace between the
countries and asserting its position against military governments
of questionable validity, the Church expanded its activities in
the region. The Church's actions may have even risen to the
level of institutional atonement to these countries' poor who
suffered most under Argentina and Chile's purges of communists and dissidents. The Church's complex and multilevel responses of objection to, dissent from, silence about, and
complicity with these countries' governments and their atrocities
are beyond the scope of this work.142 Nonetheless, all would
agree that the Church's actions were less than perfect in response to such events. Furthermore, the Church sought progress on this issue. The Church's place in Latin American
society and politics was to be addressed at the Third General
140. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 84, and -pholq preceding 57; PASSARELLI,
supra note 3, at 177.
141. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
142. See COLLIER & SATER, supra ilOte 112, at 361-62; FEITLO\VITZ, supra note
109, at 219-23.
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Assembly of the Latin American Episcopate in January, 1979.143
A war between Argentina and Chile, and perhaps spreading
throughout the entire region, would have greatly undermined
any possible progress of a general assembly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Vatican's intervention in the Beagle Channel dispute
offers an opportunity to see one instance of successful faithbased international action by the Roman Catholic Church.
Consistent with the Church's mission of making peace, the Vatican brought several unusual attributes to the process of mediation. These included the religious authority of the Church, the
ability to control information regarding the mediation, neutrality stemming from its lack of military and earthly ambitions, and
highly trained and patient bureaucratic machinery accustomed
to dealing with power and evil.
These attributes make the Church an ideal actor for international peace in disputes between countries that are predominantly Roman Catholic. The resolution of the conflict between
Argentina and Chile by the Vatican was greatly aided by the
countries' historical, political, and popular ties to the Church.
Where different religions or faiths underlie a dispute, intervention by an organized representative of the faith of one party will
be seen as lacking impartiality. Where Roman Catholicism predominates, such as in the countries of Latin America, the Vatican is aware of the special contribution it may make to maintain
and create peace. In a letter to the United Nations, John Paul II
noted these possibilities.144 The Organization of American
States is also aware of the unique service the Vatican can offer
in such situations. 145 In fact, the Beagle Channel dispute was
not the first time in the twentieth century that Vatican intervention brought peaceful solutions to international problems in
Latin America. 146 The Vatican served to facilitate Manuel
Antonio Noriega's safe and peaceful relocation to the United
States for trial. 147 In 1965, a papal nuncio helped establish a
143. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 305.
144. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 453.
145. See id. at 454.
·
146. See Apollis, supra note 4, at 333-35.
147. See James A.R. Nafziger, The F11nctions of Reli!fion in the lllfernational Legal Systenz, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V, supra note 74, at 170w71.
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cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. 1•s As other conflicts and
disputes arise in the region, it is hoped that world leaders, international organizations, and the Vatican itself remember the
successes of the Beagle Channel intervention and the unique religious perspective and tools the Vatican might bring to peacemaking in Latin America.

in

148. See William P. George, Looking for a Global Ethic? Tiy Intemationa/ Law,
supra note 74, at 495.
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